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Whereas Socrates preached temperance and frugality, and drove a wedge between 
wealth and virtue, Aristotle argued that a moderate amount of wealth was an intrinsic 
element to pursuing the good life, at least for the pater familias.1  For Aristotle, there is 
a minimum amount of wealth required to avoid a life of toil and there is a maximum 
amount above which full happiness or eudaimonia cannot be achieved (Pol 1265a30-
36).2  
Scholars of ancient economic thought have construed this upper limit to money-
making as Aristotle’s “natural limit” (see, for example, Kern 1983, 507; Pack 1985, 391; 
Lowry 1987, 232-236; César das Neves 2000, 650). Others, namely, S. Todd Lowry 
(1974, 60) and Moses I. Finley (1970, 16), have considered the view that Aristotle’s 
natural limit, and unlimited money-making generally, might be settled independently of 
the broader question of achieving the virtuous life. 
This paper argues that Aristotle’s natural limit is imposed on all members of the 
human species capable of achieving the good life and that the virtuous master of any 
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household (oikos) will wisely comply with the natural limit by acquiring and 
administering a sufficient amount of wealth to satisfy a necessary condition for attaining 
eudaimonia. This interpretation of Aristotle’s natural limit, it should be noted, is 
aligned with those advanced by others, including Charles Griswold (1999, 266) and 
Scott Meikle (1995). Meikle, for example, contends that, for Aristotle, “the good life and 
its constitutive ends set the standards for deciding how much wealth is enough” (1995, 
45). However, Meikle does not go so far as to preclude the wealth-seeking path as 
coincident with a flourishing life.3 This paper argues that the very notion of a ‘money-
making eudaimôn’ is impossible for Aristotle and it explains why this is the case. 
For Aristotle, there are several reasons why a human life committed to money-
making is incompatible with achieving eudaimonia. First, he associates the unnatural 
money-maker’s aim of accumulating an ever-larger pile of money with the life of 
pleasure, not the good life. Because Aristotle forcefully denies the hedonist identity 
thesis that the life of pleasure is the best life for humans, it is difficult to see how a life 
committed to the endless activity of commerce and trade beyond the needs of one’s 
household can coincide with achieving eudaimonia. It is also argued that, from the 
standpoint of Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean, unnatural “wealth getting” 
(chrêmatistikê) is a misguided ambition – a vice, not a virtue. It is not, in any sense, the 
objective pursued by the practically wise who acts rightly because he possesses the 
human excellences of sophia and phronêsis. Excesses such as avarice reveal a defect in 
character and if an individual can be eudaimôn only because his character is not 
defective, then actions directed towards endless money-making are, in the very least, 
                                                          
3 This statement, of course, does not imply that Meikle (1995) would disagree with the claim that a 
money-making eudaimôn is impossible for Aristotle. Indeed, he may well have considered it as a matter of 
course. 
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discouraging for the prospective money-making eudaimôn. At worst, the individual who 
pursues money-making as an end in itself risks becoming a slave to what William James 
Booth describes as the “invisible master” of pleonexia (Booth 1993, 49). This troubling 
possibility only amplifies the difficulties faced by a money-maker striving for the good 
life; after all, action directed towards acquiring unlimited riches can restrict or inhibit 
the attainment of other intrinsically valuable goods – goods that Aristotle argues are 
necessary for human flourishing, including friendship (philia), agency (praxis), and 
autonomy.  
 
Aristotle’s Natural Limit 
In Book 1 of the Politics Aristotle grapples with the topics of wealth and 
household management (oikonomikê). He asks whether money-making and oikonomikê 
are the same thing and responds in the negative, stating, “it is easy to see that the art of 
household management is not identical with the art of getting wealth, for the one uses 
the material which the other provides” (Pol 1256a9-11).4 This statement affirms 
Aristotle’s instrumental notion of wealth insofar as chrêmatistikê is a part of good 
household management. For Aristotle, all means-ends relationships are limited by their 
ends, including the master’s wealth acquisition for oikonomikê. He distinguishes 
between natural chrêmatistikê in the good sense, which is constrained by the needs of 
the household, and unnatural chrêmatistikê in the bad sense, which is unlimited and 
treats money-making and trade (kapêlikê) as an end in itself (Meikle 1995, 47). On the 
subject of natural chrêmatistikê Aristotle states,  
                                                          
4 It is worth noting that while Jowett’s canonical work translates oikonomikê as an art, others have 
considered oikonomikê to be a practical science that aims at good action (See, for example, Miller 1995). 
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of the art of acquisition … there is one kind which by nature is a part of the 
management of a household, in so far as the art of household management 
must either find ready to hand, or itself provide, such things necessary to 
life, and useful for the community of the family or state, as can be stored 
(Pol 1256b27-30). 
 
Natural chrêmatistikê involves the master of a household acquiring and administering 
those useful objects of wealth that constitute “true wealth” or “true riches” in order to 
meet the needs of all household members, including the master, his wife, children, and 
slaves. Aristotle’s disapproval of unnatural chrêmatistikê, however, does not imply 
opposition to all forms of money-making, but only those belonging to commercial and 
trade activities that are completely divorced from the ends of oikonomikê. Thus, if a 
person trades to make money and this activity is directed towards self-sufficiency, 
Aristotle does not condemn it since it remains bound by oikonomikê.5 
In the Politics, Aristotle provides an account of the origins of currency and 
unnatural money-making. We are told that in ancient times individuals and households 
originally exchanged goods for goods in order to meet their natural needs and that this 
form of barter exchange was mutually beneficial for all parties involved. This natural 
process of bartering goods for goods for their use value, as opposed to their exchange 
value, eventually gave rise to the unnatural chrêmatistikê that is characteristic of retail 
trade. Unlike the natural acquisition of wealth, unnatural chrêmatistikê, or simply 
“money-making”, describes actions directed towards the pursuit of unlimited riches. 
Unlike natural chrêmatistikê that serves the needs of the household, money-making for 
its own sake is an artificial practice that involves acquiring unlimited riches and 
                                                          
5 This creates a puzzle for Aristotle since instances of unnatural chrêmatistikê, those bound by 
oikonomikê, are within the confines of the natural limit. In Marxian terms, C-M-C is natural and M-C-M’ 
is unnatural (see Meikle 1995, 51-52). One way that Aristotle might have responded to this objection 
would be to maintain that instances of unnatural chrêmatistikê bound by oikonomikê only appear to be 
unnatural chrêmatistikê (M-C-M’). Since such activities are ultimately constrained by oikonomikê they 
are, in the long run, actually structured as C-M-C. 
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therefore, extends acquisition beyond the true wealth required to administer a self-
sufficient oikos.  
The ancient Greek oikos was, for Aristotle, a natural and co-operative human 
association fully embedded in the wider polis. This composite entity comprised the 
physical property belonging to the oikos, the master, his wife, children, slaves and hired 
labor. Invariably, the oikos was characterized by the superior parts ruling over inferior 
ones. This meant that husbands ruled over wives and masters ruled over slaves, as the 
soul ruled over the body (Nagle 2006; Roberts 2009).6 
For Aristotle, the concept of “nature” has several different meanings (see 
Collingwood [1945] 1976, 81-85). In one sense, the concept denotes an inner principle of 
change that is characteristic of self-moving things. Unlike unnatural or artificial objects, 
natural objects are involved in a process of growth, change, and flux.7 Nature, in this 
sense, is deeply intertwined with how things behave when left to themselves, free from 
human agency. In another sense, “nature” denotes specific items that exist by nature, 
and not by any other causes. Aristotle has this sense of “nature” in mind when he reviles 
usury. As Joel Kaye explains, “Aristotle believed usury was the most despicable and 
unnatural, because in the usurious loan, money, which was invented solely as an 
instrument of exchange, is made to generate itself, to give unnatural birth to itself” 
(1998, 87). Money does not exist by nature, but by law or convention (NE 1133a30ff); 
usury is a particularly bad kind of unnatural chrêmatistikê because money was created 
with a specific telos, to facilitate exchange.8 The charging of interest (tokos), which 
                                                          
6 As Fred D. Miller explains, “Aristotle’s inegalitarianism is based on the alleged natural inferiority of 
whole classes of persons as defined by nationality, gender, and profession” (2005, 242). 
7 For much more on the detail of Aristotle’s distinction between “natural” and “artificial”, see Physics 2.1, 
192b12-23. 
8 Aristotle also recognizes that money can serve as a unit of account and a store of wealth. 
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involves money begetting money, is unnatural because this activity is not in accordance 
with the end for which money was originally created. Therefore, Aristotle condemns the 
charging of tokos because this activity distorts the purpose of money. 
In the Politics, Aristotle acknowledges the limitless activity of acquiring ever 
more riches when he states, 
natural riches and the natural art of wealth-getting are a different thing; in 
their true form they are part of the management of a household; whereas 
retail trade is the art of producing wealth, not in every way, but by 
exchange. And it is thought to be concerned with coin; for coin is the unit 
of exchange and the limit of it. And there is no bound to the riches which 
spring from this art of wealth-getting (Pol 1257b19-24). 
 
As Meikle (1994, 28) observes, for Aristotle, a pile of riches can differ from another only 
in magnitude, and not qualitatively. Because money is a quantity, it has no limit; this is 
why Aristotle accepts that unnatural chrêmatistikê, even though it is a disparaged 
species of money-making, has no bound. But while Aristotle accepts the platitude that 
one can always add another coin to his pile of riches, he contrasts his position with that 
endorsed by the Greek Athenian statesman, Solon. Aristotle states, 
they are the elements of true riches; for the amount of property which is 
needed for a good life is not unlimited, although Solon in one of his poems 
says that  
No Bound to riches has been fixed for man. 
But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other arts; for the 
instrument of any art are never unlimited, either in number or size, and 
riches may be defined as a number of instruments to be used in a 
household or in a state (Pol 1256b30-36). 
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Aristotle appears to be using Solon’s poem to establish that the tools of any art, 
including oikonomikê, are never infinite (apeiron).9 It is primarily from these the two 
passages (directly above) that scholars have attributed Aristotle with a natural limit.10 
Others, however, have denied that Aristotle ever acknowledged such a limit. For 
example, in his Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century, Kaye states, “if money 
were natural, [Aristotle] reasoned, then there would be a natural limit to the desire for 
riches. Since it was clear to him that this natural limit did not exist, he concluded that 
‘retail trade is not a natural part of the art of getting wealth’” (1998, 55). Aristotle, 
however, was never so explicit and it is not apparent that he actually reasoned this way. 
Although Aristotle agrees with Solon that riches, like all quantities, have an unlimited 
nature, he also appears to maintain that the true wealth of any oikos is limited to that set 
of useful goods required for the good life. As Charles Griswold states, “Aristotle quotes 
Solon to the effect that wealth, and implicitly the desire for it, knows no boundary but 
replies that there is such a limit, namely that defined by the good life” (1999, 266). 
William Kern offers a similar interpretation when he states, “wealth and external goods 
are a means to an end for Aristotle; as such there is some ‘natural’ limit to the needs of 
individuals as dictated by the ultimate good” (1983, 507). Given the above passages 
quoted from the Politics, and, moreover, because Aristotle is rather lucid on what he 
claims is the instrumental nature of true wealth, the natural limit not only “exists” but 
stands in direct relation to his account of the good life. 
                                                          
9 This poem can be found in M.L. West’s (1972) Iambi et Elegi Graeci (poem 13).  
10 Lowry (1974, 1987) describes the historical dimension of Aristotle’s natural limit. Lowry has argued that 
the consumption-oriented barter system of ancient Athens provided a natural limit on monetary 
accumulation for its own sake and that this system failed in part because of the metics (resident aliens), 
who were merchants interested in money accumulation above and beyond the use value of consumption 
goods. 
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Why, then, is there confusion over the putatively questionable existence of the 
natural limit and, moreover, why have some scholars attempted to disconnect the 
natural limit from Aristotle’s ethics? It seems that part of the confusion over Aristotle’s 
natural limit derives from conflating the terms “unlimited” and “endless”. Unnatural 
chrêmatistikê is an endless activity because riches have a quantitative nature and if 
action is directed towards the objective of unnatural chrêmatistikê, then such activity is 
endless. On the other hand, because there are only so many useful things for the master 
of any household to acquire and use, once he has acquired true wealth the oikos will be 
lacking in nothing and the natural terminus of the oikos will be met. 
Another misunderstanding seems to arise from the contingency of Aristotle’s 
natural limit. S. Todd Lowry has argued that the natural limit is contingent on a person’s 
use of wealth. He states, “as long as money is sought only for the object of buying goods 
to be used, the constraints of the natural limit of desire operate” (1974, 61). If this were 
true, then Aristotle’s natural limit would only operate if the master restricted his wealth 
acquisition to a peculiar sort and level: to those objects that are useful for administering 
the oikos. For every other instance, where the objects of wealth are used in exchange (a 
practise that Aristotle believes is almost always characteristic of commercial or trade 
activities), the natural limit would not be operational. This reading, however, fails to 
recognize that Aristotle defines the limit in relation to his objective account of the good 
life whereby the constraint on wealth acquisition applies generally to humans capable of 
achieving eudaimonia (adult free male human citizens). Under this view, Aristotle’s 
natural limit cannot be contingent on any person’s subjective choice to acquire or use 
wealth in any particular way, but on their being a member of the human species. Thus, a 
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virtuous person who manages the oikos will respect the natural limit while a non-
virtuous person may exceed it.  
Other scholars acknowledge the existence of the natural limit but question 
whether unnatural money-making might be expurgated from the ethical sphere 
altogether. For example, as a part of his main claim that Aristotle’s economic writings in 
Nichomachean Ethics fail to meet certain criteria of economic analysis,11 Finley (1970) 
argues that because Aristotle’s ethics has a natural basis and unlimited money-making is 
unnatural, the latter is not a subject for ethical discourse. He further adds that the 
acquisition of money beyond the natural requirements of a household, “is made ‘not 
according to nature but at the expense of others’12, a phrase that echoes in reverse the 
‘each has his own’ of the Ethics and gives the final proof that commercial exchange was 
not the subject in the Ethics” (1970, 17). This confusing statement apparently indicates 
that Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics can be effectively described by the phrase “each 
has his own”, and that this is evidence for demonstrating that the text does not concern 
unnatural chrêmatistikê. But if this phrase is meant to portray Aristotle’s virtue ethics 
as an individualist kind of ethical theory, then Finley is mistaken. Nichomachean Ethics 
is, of course, replete with discussion of the social excellences, namely the preeminent 
excellence of justice. Furthermore, virtues, like courage, moderation, munificence, and 
open-handedness not only benefit the virtuous individuals who possess them but are 
positively connected to the welfare of others.13 
The idea of a detachment between Aristotle’s natural limit and his account of the 
good life is also explored by Lowry (1974, 60; 1987, 232-236) when he criticizes W.L 
                                                          
11 Finley ([1973] 1999, 21; italics in the original) claims that Aristotle, “wrote no Economics.”  
12 Here, Finley cites Pol 1258b1-2. 
13 This is true even if the virtues remain primarily individualistic. 
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Newman ([1887] 1950) for associating “the natural limit with a concept of virtue 
deduced from the hypothetical good life.” Lowry suggests the possibility that Aristotle’s 
concept of natural limit might be explained by reference to naturalistic and materialistic 
terms – without the need for moral terms.14 This view is puzzling, however, since 
Aristotle’s ethical theory is itself naturalistic: the good or flourishing of any creature 
with a particular nature, including humans, necessarily requires living up to that nature. 
Contrary to the views considered by Finley and Lowry, Aristotle’s natural limit 
cannot be properly understood without references to Aristotle’s ethical thought; rather, 
the natural limit is inextricably linked to his account of human flourishing or 
eudaimonia. In addition to the passages from Aristotle’s writings considered already, 
one need not look too far for more evidence to support this claim. In the passage of the 
Politics where Aristotle refers to Solon’s poem (cited above), he makes a clear 
connection between a limit on the one hand, and the role of that limit in relation to the 
good life on the other. In Book 6 of Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle baldly states, 
“perhaps one’s well-being is inseparable from managing a household” (NE 1142a9-10).15 
In the Politics, while alluding to the erroneous ways of unnatural pleasure-driven 
chrêmatistikê, Aristotle again reinforces the relationship between oikonomikê and living 
well or the good life. He states, 
some persons are led to believe that getting wealth is the object of 
household management, and the whole idea of their lives is that they 
ought either to increase their money without limit, or at any rate not to 
lose it. The origin of this disposition in men is that they are intent upon 
living only, and not upon living well (Pol 1257b38-1258a1). 
 
                                                          
14 Newman claims that oikonomikê is an practical science. He states, “The household must be placed 
under the authority of a head who knows that the quest of commodities should be kept within the limits 
which the interests of virtue and happiness impose” ([1887] 1950, 127). 
15 All references to Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics refer to Christopher Rowe’s translation (Broadie and 
Rowe 2002). 
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While the distinction Aristotle makes between natural and unnatural 
chrêmatistikê is essential to the intelligibility of the natural limit, it cannot, on its own, 
provide an adequate account of the concept. Unnatural chrêmatistikê goes beyond what 
is required for oikonomikê and exceeds the limit of true wealth, the level of wealth 
requisite for the good life. Therefore, a satisfactory account of Aristotle’s natural limit 
will clarify how chrêmatistikê and household management are consistent with 
Aristotle’s virtue ethics, and this requires understanding the interplay between 
Aristotle’s ethical theory, oikonomikê, and the acquisition of true wealth. 
For Aristotle, the self-sufficiency of a household is sometimes understood as 
“autarky”, “independence from others”, “lacking in nothing”, or “getting enough” 
(Meikle 1995). If the meaning of self-sufficiency is understood as “getting enough” (or 
indeed, any of the other meanings as well) then surely this gives rise to a crucial 
question: getting enough for what? While taking action to acquire the set of useful 
objects or true wealth is a basic concern for the master of any household, it would be 
folly to conclude that such an acquisition is the final end of humans engaged in 
oikonomikê. For Aristotle, although any good human life requires the natural 
associations of households and a polis, the ultimate end is eudaimonia or the Chief 
Good. In his The Household as the Foundation of Aristotle’s Polis, D. Brendan Nagle 
states,  
Autarky is not limited to the satisfaction of mere material needs. Human 
flourishing can only be achieved in a setting in which the household and 
political community are integrated as a single entity, each interacting with 
and sustaining one another. Without the fundamental relationships that a 
household provides and nourishes, the individual cannot flourish (2006, 
91).  
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Seen in this light, from the viewpoint of human lives on the whole, the self-sufficiency of 
households is a necessary, though intermediary, step along the road to eudaimonia. 
Good oikonomikê results in a self-sufficient oikos. Such an oikos will not only provide 
the subsistence needs of each household member, but for those individuals capable of 
achieving eudaimonia, the household’s true wealth will also confer the basis for 
pursuing those non-pecuniary goods that Aristotle tells us are necessary conditions for 
the good life.16 
 
The “Money-Making Eudaimôn”? 
So far, this paper has argued that oikonomikê is invariably tied to eudaimonia. It 
should be clear that, for Aristotle, the final end of human life does not require unlimited 
amounts of wealth. Eudaimonia is discussed at length towards the beginning of 
Nichomachean Ethics and is famously considered by Aristotle to be the summum 
bonum – the ultimate end of human life that is inclusive of all intrinsically valuable 
goods.17 In Book 1 of Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes eudaimonia as complete 
without qualification and therefore, “always desirable in itself and never because of 
something else”. The eudaimôn is a “blessedly happy” and flourishing human being who 
                                                          
16 This paper is only concerned with individuals that Aristotle considers capable of achieving eudaimonia. 
For Aristotle, only the ruling free men heads of the household need complete virtue of character. Although 
women have the capacity for deliberation, this capacity is without authority (see Book 1, Chapter 13 of the 
Politics), which, as Roberts (2009) explains, means that women can think of their good and how they 
might attain it but that deliberation is not in their full control. Both women and children can achieve 
virtue relative to their inferior souls (Pol, 1260a 20-4). Slaves, on the other hand, lack practical wisdom, 
the capacity to deliberate, and they also have an inferior rational part of the soul (Miller 2005). For more 
on Aristotle’s account of the nature of women, see Smith (1983). 
17 This is, arguably, the most common interpretation of eudaimonia. Thomas Nagel (1980) describes the 
competing intellectualist account of human flourishing (derived mostly from Book 10 of Nichomachean 
Ethics) whereby eudaimonia is realized in the activity of theoretical contemplation. For more on this 
second interpretation, see Richard Kraut’s (1989) Aristotle on the Human Good. These two accounts of 
eudaimonia are sometimes referred to as the “inclusive” and “dominant end” conceptions (see Hardie 
1965). 
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possesses the human excellences, and therefore, possesses the right kinds of 
dispositions (virtues) when it comes to action. As J.L. Ackrill states, “(i) you cannot say 
of eudaimonia that you seek it for the sake of eudaimonia; (ii) you cannot say you would 
prefer eudaimonia plus something extra to eudaimonia” (1980, 22). Given this rigorous 
definition of the good life, objections to its being the final end of human life are 
immediately strained: one is compelled to argue that the final end of human life is 
somehow not the best life imaginable but rather an inferior life of sorts, one composed 
of less rather than more of the intrinsically valuable goods. 
In the remaining sections it is argued that if an individual treats money-making 
as an end in itself, unconstrained by the needs of his household, he cannot be eudaimôn. 
The main question to be investigated is whether, for Aristotle, it is feasible for any agent 
to engage in money-making while simultaneously living a flourishing human life. To put 
it another way, are there eudemonic individuals who are also engaged in money-making 
as an end in itself? Three reasons are given to deny this conjunction. For Aristotle, 
money-making as an end in itself is endemic to the life of pleasure, not the good life; 
action directed towards the pursuit of ever more money is likely to crowd out other 
intrinsically valuable goods; finally, wealth acquisition beyond the natural limit is 
excessive from the standpoint of Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean. 
 
Money-making and the life of pleasure 
Aristotle associates the unnatural money-maker’s goal of accumulating an ever-
larger pile of money with the life of pleasure. In the Politics, he states, 
those who do aim at a good life seek the means of obtaining bodily 
pleasures; and, since the enjoyment of these appears to depend on 
property, they are absorbed in getting wealth: and so there arises the 
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second species of wealth-getting. For, as their enjoyment is in excess, they 
seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment (Pol 1258a3-7). 
 
This quotation suggests that Aristotle not only links the second species of wealth-
getting, unnatural chrêmatistikê, with pleasurable things but that he believes the basis 
or motivation for individuals to engage in such pursuits is bodily pleasures. The 
reference to “excess” in combination with unnatural chrêmatistikê and pleasure is also 
telling; according to Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean, excess and deficiency always 
reveal a defect in one’s character. 
Although Aristotle recognizes that pleasure, with certain qualifications, is itself 
an intrinsically valuable good (for him it is difficult to imagine any life worthy of the 
name “good” without any pleasure whatsoever),18 he argues against identifying pleasure 
with eudaimonia. Thomas Nagel (1980, 21-22) describes why pleasure, for Aristotle, 
must be a subset of all intrinsically valuable goods within the realm of eudaimonia. 
Although one can answer the question “Why do you seek pleasure?” by stating that you 
seek it as an element in the most desirable sort of life, one cannot be expected to answer 
the question “Why do you seek the most desirable sort of life?”, at least not in the same 
way. This does not imply that pleasure is not intrinsically worthwhile, but only that it is 
a means to an end. It is partly the instrumental quality of pleasure itself that is a reason 
why eudaimonia is not “just pleasure”. Moreover, for Aristotle, pleasure is an 
intrinsically valuable good but not at all times and in all situations. It bears this quality 
for individuals only when it is the consequence of taking the right kinds of actions in the 
                                                          
18 Living well involves pleasure because the virtuous individual finds it satisfying to live up to his ideals 
(see Nichomachean Ethics, 1.8). 
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right circumstances, something that the humanly excellent individual performs 
invariably. 
Aristotle’s function (ergon) argument, originally put forward in Book 1, Chapter 7 
of Nichomachean Ethics, is highly relevant to the connection he draws between 
unnatural chrêmatistikê and the life of pleasure. The conclusion of this argument 
implies that the good of any kind of being ultimately resides in its function. For 
Aristotle, to know the good of a quality, for example, depends on the substance at hand, 
and in the case of humans, there is a normative natural goodness for the kind of being a 
human is. Whatever a good human life proves to be, it certainly has to be characteristic 
of human beings or as Martha Nussbaum explains, “a good active life for a being must 
first of all be a life for that being – i.e. it had better include those activities that are 
essential to, definitive of, that sort of being” (1995, 112). 
Aristotle asks, then, what it is that humans characteristically do and whether 
there is an essential quality belonging to humans without which the members of this 
class would lack a distinctive nature. After acknowledging that humans share just about 
everything in common with other plants and animals, Aristotle concludes that the 
unique and highest-order functioning of humans is their capacity for reasoning or 
deliberation, a function that he attributes to the immaterial human soul. Therefore, the 
life of mere pleasure for human beings misses the mark for humans (save slaves) 
because it fails to demand of humans the full exercise of their practical and theoretical 
reasoning. Indeed, Aristotle thinks that for humans to pursue the life of pleasure, 
wrongly conflating it with the good life, is to accept a mindless life, one that is available 
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to “grazing cattle” (NE 1095b21). In such a case, Aristotle states, “there wouldn’t be any 
difference being born a beast and a human being”.19 
Aristotle also employs his function argument against those who would direct all 
of their human faculties towards the goal of attaining ever more pleasure. For Aristotle, 
such a move is contrary to the multifarious ergon of human faculties. In the Politics, for 
example, he states, 
if they are not able to supply their pleasures by the art of getting wealth, 
they try other causes, using in turn every faculty in a manner contrary to 
nature. The quality of courage, for example, is not intended to make 
wealth, but to inspire confidence … Nevertheless, some men turn every 
quality or art into a means of getting wealth; this they conceive to be the 
end, and to the promotion of the end they think all things must contribute 
(Pol 1258a8-14). 
 
If treating money-making as an end in itself is symptomatic of a life directed at 
pleasure then it is difficult to see how, for Aristotle, such a pleasure-seeking life can also 
be eudaimôn since Aristotle clearly objects to the hedonist’s identity thesis. It remains 
to be answered, however, whether the money-maker might respond by claiming that he 
pursues endless riches as an end in itself (as detailed in the previous quote), thus 
denying Aristotle’s claim that it is for pleasure or even the life of pleasure that he 
engages in such projects. If one follows Ackrill’s interpretation of eudaimonia as “the 
most desirable sort of life, the life that contains all intrinsically worthwhile activities” 
(1980, 21), then such a money-maker would have to explain how unnatural 
chrêmatistikê is an intrinsically worthwhile activity. If such an objection were 
compelling it would point to a serious omission on Aristotle’s part, for it would imply 
that unlimited money-making is somehow valuable in itself. Unlimited money-making 
would then have to become a part of the good life prescribed by Aristotle. But Aristotle 
                                                          
19 Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics (1215b28-37) is quoted by Nussbaum (1995, 116).  
 Forthcoming in History of Political Economy January, 2014 
17 
 
offers a simple rebuttal to silence this objection. As discussed earlier, he highlights the 
instrumental role of money, thus denying any claim to its intrinsic worth: “The life of 
the money maker is of a sort that is chosen under compulsion of need, and wealth is 
clearly not the good we are looking for, since it is useful, and for the sake of something 
else” (NE 1096a5-8). 
 
The crowding out effect of money-making 
Another reason to deny that an individual might pursue boundless money-
making and simultaneously live a flourishing life is discussed at length by William 
James Booth (1993) in his Households: on the Moral Architecture of the Economy. 
Although he does not argue in such explicit terms, in effect he claims that a life devoted 
to money-making beyond the needs of one’s household can restrict or crowd out other 
intrinsically valuable goods and conditions for the good life, including leisure (scholē) 
time, philia and freedom from constraint or autonomy. For these reasons, the useless 
objects of wealth – the ones without a use for the household – that the money-maker 
spends his time acquiring are not benign but can be injurious to the welfare of the 
person acquiring such objects. In sum, the endless activity of money-making can act as 
an impediment to what might otherwise be a flourishing human life. 
To understand why this is the case, we need to realize that, although the 
immediate objective of oikonomikê is to meet the basic needs of household members, 
another key purpose in acquiring true wealth involves becoming independent or free 
from the constraints imposed by others and nature. The acquisition of true wealth is 
partly a means to become self-sufficient or autarkic. Booth (1993, 44-46) argues that 
autarky, the freedom from necessary toil and from the restraint of others, is closely 
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related to scholē and the space leisure creates for cultivating friendships and the 
possibility for participating in the affairs of the polis. In the Politics, Aristotle explains 
that scholē is better than, and is the end of, occupation, which is always accompanied 
with exertion and effort. Unlike the “busy man” who does not have any leisure, those 
who have it derive pleasure, happiness, and enjoyment of life from leisure itself (Pol 
1337b27-1338a3).20 Scholē is, in the main, made possible by having a self-sufficient 
household. As Nagle states, “small surpluses were necessary, but the aim of farming was 
not to produce large surpluses for an export market. The properties should be sufficient 
to supply enough goods to sustain the citizen and his family in leisure” (2006, 130). If 
self-sufficiency implies having enough for the good life, as I have argued above, and if 
leisure is an intrinsically valuable good that is required for the good life, then a self-
sufficient household endowed with true wealth will also provide leisure time for its free 
members. The master whose household is entirely autarkic will have the leisure time 
available to choose whether or not to pursue praxis and other intrinsically valuable 
goods. Leisure is made possible by acquiring sufficient true wealth, that is, enough to 
grant the free members of a household with the good fortune of participating in valuable 
activities, activities that go beyond economically necessary actions. 
Booth underscores the importance of leisure as a basic goal for the ancient 
household and ties scholē to philia, not only amongst household members, but amongst 
the members of different households throughout the city.21 He states, “leisure is 
                                                          
20 Aristotle also recognizes that men are busy in order to have leisure (see Chapter 7, Book 10 of 
Nichomachean Ethics 1177b5). It is worth recognizing that in Plato’s Phaedo (66d) Socrates recognizes 
leisure as a necessary condition for doing philosophy (Cooper 1997). 
21 Booth (1993, 31-32) states “[household management] aims at something more than the satisfaction of 
material wants: its object is also to preserve, as far as possible, the household’s philia, the common bond 
and purpose of its free members, against the intrusions of constraint and necessity which are an essential 
part of the reproduction of human livelihood.” 
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necessary for both the private philia of persons hunting or philosophizing and also for 
the friendship of the larger community, that of the city” and “leisure is required for 
political praxis and excellence, just as it is for the virtues of private friendships” (1993, 
46-7). For Aristotle, all friendships are characterized by mutual liking: a friend is 
someone who likes and is liked by another person.22 In Eudemian Ethics, he 
distinguishes three types of friendship: for virtue (kat’ aretên), for utility (kata to 
chrêsimon), and for pleasure (kata to hêdu).23 The first type, sometimes referred to as 
character friendships, is essential for achieving eudaimonia. Their primary purpose is to 
develop the moral goodness of each person involved in the relationship (see Cooper 
1980). These relations are exceptional and involve well-wishing that is fully reciprocated 
between the parties involved. They are also grounded in knowledge of and love of one 
another’s good qualities of character. On the other hand, utility and pleasure friendships 
are, on the whole, less enduring than character friendships. The former (for example, 
business relations) ceases to exist when the advantages of the relationship end, while 
pleasure friendships merely involve loving another person for their incidental features – 
not for their character. 
In fact, Aristotle dedicates a significant portion of Nichomachean Ethics 
(especially Books 8 and 9) to the topic of friendship and elaborates on the direct 
connection character or virtue friendships have for eudaimonia. In these chapters, 
Aristotle affirms that such friendships are “very necessary for living” and that “no one 
would choose to live without friends” (NE 1169b10); in Book 9 he affirms that friends 
seem to be the greatest of external goods. John M. Cooper (1980, 317-318) argues that, 
                                                          
22 See the Rhetoric (1380b36-1381a2) in Barnes ([1984] 1995). 
23 See Eudemian Ethics (7.10, 1242b2-3) in Barnes ([1984] 1995). 
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for Aristotle, friends are good “as such” for human beings, implying that their value is 
not exhausted in terms of instrumental values alone; on the contrary they are a 
necessary condition for a flourishing human life. In fact, Cooper goes so far as to argue 
that Aristotle’s theory of virtue cannot be completely understood unless read in light of 
the chapters on friendship. 
But why would the eudaimôn, if he is indeed eudemonic, need something else, 
including friends, if the good life is, by definition, complete? Cooper argues that the 
eudaimôn needs self-knowledge and the most comprehensive way to acquire and 
maintain such knowledge of the self is through character-friendships. If one accepts 
Cooper’s interpretation of Aristotle’s claim that self-knowledge is a feature of authentic 
character-friendships and that it is, therefore, an intrinsically valuable constituent of the 
good life, then one can begin to appreciate why Aristotle emphasizes the creation of 
leisure time as a main purpose for the oikos. 
It is easy to imagine a life wholly committed to money-making as an end in itself, 
one that involves undue time commitment. Such a life will be prone to a crowding out 
effect that results in a severe diminishment of one’s overall leisure time; and, if scholē is 
a pre-condition for friendship in general and character-friendships in particular, then 
any such individual who finds himself bound to a project without end, such as money-
making beyond the needs of one’s household, is likely to forego these intrinsically 
valuable human associations. 
A characteristic feature of a self-sufficient oikos is that all of the free members 
have become autonomous. For the master who chooses to pursue unnatural 
chrêmatistikê, autonomy may be available, but he forgoes the opportunity and replaces 
it with a project that is both endless and insatiable. The individual engaged in perpetual 
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action directed towards a project without end surrenders his autonomy by becoming a 
“slave to money-making”. Describing a passage from Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, Booth 
(1993, 49) states, “those who do not rule their households with the purpose in mind of 
securing the good life may have many possessions but it is as if they are themselves 
governed by Xenophon’s ‘invisible masters’ in their quest after still more wealth.”24 Such 
a life is unleisured because its demands are never ending and, moreover, it is lead under 
constraint. Indeed, Aristotle explicitly states that “The life of the money maker is of a 
sort that is chosen under compulsion of need” (NE 1096a5-6).25 Not only can unlimited 
wealth acquisition lead to the loss of the money-maker’s overall freedom, autonomy and 
other intrinsically valuable goods that could have been afforded with less wealth but, as 
Booth suggests, the money-maker develops a disposition towards the excess of 
pleonexia. Such excesses are vices for Aristotle, and, as a consequence, the efforts of our 
so-called “money-making eudaimôn” are hindered ever more. 
 
Unlimited money-making as an excess 
For individuals aiming at the good life, unnatural chrêmatistikê is an ill-advised 
activity for it is not an aim of the practically wise (phronimos) who is eudaimôn because 
he possesses the human excellences.26 J.O. Urmson (1980) interprets Aristotle’s account 
of good and bad character in Nichomachean Ethics as the Doctrine of the Mean, 
                                                          
24 Referring to Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, I.I8ff, Booth suggests that the “invisible master” ruling over 
Kritoboulus (Socrates’ main interlocutor) is pleonexia. In Oeconomicus, I.22ff, Socrates describes slaves 
that are ruled by “harsh masters”. Some such slaves are “ruled by gluttony, some by fornication, some by 
drunkenness, and some by foolish and expensive ambitions which rule cruelly over any men they get into 
their power” (See Pomeroy 1994). The point that is being made by Socrates is that if one becomes a slave 
to such a master, then goods and money can destroy one’s body and soul. 
25 Quoting the same passage from Nichomachean Ethics, Finley (1970, 47) translates Aristotle as stating, 
“the money-maker is someone who lives under constraint.” 
26 Urmson (1980, 160) states, “Excellence of character is … that state of character which entitles a man to 
be called eudaimōn.”  
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whereby the individual endowed with phronēsis and an excellent character will choose 
the right action, the mean. This intermediate or midway position can be thought of as a 
point along a continuum between deficiency, on the one hand, and excess on the other.27 
Excess and deficiency flank “each side” of the excellences, like courage, moderation, 
greatness of soul, open-handedness, etc. Not only does the phronimos’ actions display 
mean states, but as Urmson (1980) suggests, the individual with an excellent character 
will also display the mean emotional and choice states as well. In other words, the 
individual possessing human excellence will be wise enough to consistently choose the 
right actions in potentially dissimilar contexts and will also want to do the right action 
and derive pleasure from it. 
For Aristotle, failing to choose the mean or particular excellences in a given 
situation reveals a defective character. But while this is a common interpretation of 
Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean, it is not strictly true, since successfully choosing the 
intermediate does not necessarily imply an agent has an excellent character.28 An agent 
may be sufficiently disciplined to take the right action – the same action as the 
phronimos – but he might simultaneously fail to manifest the right kind of emotional 
response. This describes the profile or character of the individual with “self-control”. 
The other two character-types described by Urmson, in increasing order of badness, are 
individuals that “lack self-control” and those who possess “badness of character” (1980, 
163). The former is capable only of choosing in the same manner as the phronimos but 
                                                          
27 As Sarah Broadie (2002) describes, human excellence is an unconditional preparedness to act, feel, and 
in general respond in the ways typical of the humanly excellent person, whereas the latter is only an 
ability to act and respond. 
28 For a challenge to Urmson’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean, see Rosalind Hursthouse 
(1980-1981). 
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fails to display the mean emotional and mean action states, while the latter, the worst 
character of all, fails to display all of the mean states: emotional, action, and choice. 
The virtue of particular relevance to Aristotle’s natural limit and wealth 
acquisition is open-handedness, the intermediate state regarding the giving and 
receiving of money. In Book 4 of Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle describes the open-
handed person in the following passage: 
Things that have a use can be used both well and badly; wealth is 
something that has a use; and each thing is used best by the person 
possessing the excellence relating to that thing: wealth, then, too, will be 
used best by the person possessing the excellence relating to money, and 
this is the open-handed person (NE 1120a5-8). 
 
Because he possesses the excellences, the phronimos will act rightly and will 
choose the intermediate of open-handedness. Aristotle explains that “wisdom is a 
disposition accompanied by rational prescription … in the sphere of human goods, 
relating to action” (NE 1140b20-23). Individuals of defective character, especially those 
who lack self-control or possess a bad character, will display a deficiency or excess with 
respect to the virtues. Actions directed towards endless wealth acquisition, representing 
the desire for an unfairly large share of distributable goods, are considered bad because 
such actions are a form of excess – avariciousness – and thus, a vice. If the phronimos is 
eudaimôn because his character is not defective in such ways, then it would seem that 
actions directed towards excessive money-making would be, at the very least, 
inauspicious for the would-be money-making eudaimôn. Indeed, Griswold goes even 
further, stating: “commerce unregulated by a vision of the good or virtuous life destroys 
the character of the citizens” (1999, 266). 
One might object to my argument by claiming that generosity, or what Aristotle 
terms “munificence” in Book 4 of Nichomachean Ethics, seems to involve expenditure 
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that extends beyond oikonomikê. It might seem prima facie that if one is obliged to 
engage in such seemingly extraneous expenditures, the natural limit would not apply. 
However, because munificence is itself a virtue, it is also governed by the Doctrine of the 
Mean and is therefore flanked by deficiency and excess (in this case, shabbiness and 
tastelessness, respectively). Although munificence may involve expenditure that extends 
beyond oikonomikê, the virtuous person may engage in such expenditures, but only on a 
suitable scale that is both relative to the person concerned and the specific context at 
hand. 
Another worry is that, while the money-maker may possess a defective character 
with respect to the virtue of open-handedness, he may nonetheless possess some or even 
all of the other Aristotelian virtues, and thus, it would seem hardly fair to deny the 
possibility of a money-making eudaimôn. Moreover, one might question a life that is 
only “partly” committed to unnatural chrêmatistikê. The claim defended in this paper is 
that, for Aristotle, endless wealth acquisition is an activity that goes beyond acquiring 
true wealth and that pleonexia will always hinder or work against the money-maker’s 
ambition to also become eudaimôn, instead of facilitating what might otherwise be a 
fully flourishing life. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that Aristotle’s natural limit is inseparably tied to his 
ethical theory, implying as it does that true wealth is “having enough” useful objects of 
wealth for household management and, ultimately, for the good life. Moreover, for 
Aristotle, an individual who treats money-making as an end-in-itself cannot 
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simultaneously attain eudaimonia or live a flourishing human life. Three reasons were 
given to support this claim. First, Aristotle associates unnatural and unlimited project of 
money-making with the life of pleasure, not the good life. Given Aristotle’s function 
argument and his dismissal of the life of pleasure as the best life available to humans, it 
is difficult to see how one who perpetually engaged in unnatural chrêmatistikê could 
also achieve eudaimonia. Second, following Booth (1993), it was argued that a life 
devoted to money-making independent of the needs of one’s household can crowd out 
or even restrict other intrinsically valuable goods that Aristotle deems necessary for 
achieving eudaimonia, such as philia and autonomy. Third, according to Aristotle’s 
Doctrine of the Mean, activities directed at unnatural chrêmatistikê are simply the 
wrong aim for anyone striving for the good life. Limitless wealth acquisition is closely 
related to the excess of the virtue of open-handedness, pleonexia, and therefore it is not 
an objective pursued by the practically wise phronimos in possession of the human 
excellences. In fact, displaying pleonexia reveals a deficit in character and is a form of 
badness that moves the money-maker further away from attaining eudaimonia. 
While these reasons were marshalled as evidence to negate the proposition that 
Aristotle would accept the notion of a money-making eudaimôn, one might persist by 
objecting that unnatural chrêmatistikê is or could really be independent of the good life. 
Of course, this paper has already argued to the contrary. But to respond even further, it 
would certainly be surprising if, on Aristotle’s account, human action directed towards 
excessive money-making always had a deleterious effect on one’s well-being and yet 
unnatural chrêmatistikê was still somehow independent of the good life. Therefore, one 
of the main conclusions defended in this paper, that Aristotle would deny the possibility 
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of a money-making eudaimôn, is itself more evidence for the specific interpretation of 
Aristotle’s natural limit defended in this paper. 
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